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ABSTRACT
We model imperfect contract enforcement when repudiators and their victims default to spot
trading. The interaction between the contract and spot markets under improved enforcement can
exacerbate repudiation and reduce contract execution, harming all traders. Improved contract execution
benefits traders on the excess side of the spot market by attracting potential counter-parties, but harms
them by impeding their exit from contracts found to be unfavorable. Multiple equilibria and multiple
optima are possible, with anarchy a local optimum, perfect enforcement a local minimum and imperfect
enforcement a global optimum. LDCs exhibit parameter combinations such that imperfect enforcement
is optimal from their side of international markets. The model thus rationalizes the internationally varying
patterns of imperfect enforceability observable in survey data.
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leslieyoung@cuhk.edu.hkThe reliability of contract enforcement varies widely across countries according to opinion
surveys of traders, resulting in significant reduction of trade (Anderson and Marcouiller,
2001). Why do many countries fail to develop institutions that ensure contract enforcement,
thereby garnering the full gains from trade? One possibility is that the ruling elite benefits
from a pliant judiciary and contractual chaos and thus has little incentive to foster the rule of
law. However, even such an elite could gain by ensuring contract enforcement in a sphere
such as international trade, which yields taxable activities and business opportunities. Another
possible explanation is institutional incapacity: lack of skilled personnel, professional norms
and organizational frameworks. Yet, many less developed countries (LDCs) with generally
weak institutions operate free trade zones with transparent business environments, which
could presumably be extended to all international trade if that were expedient. Therefore, the
imperfect contract enforcement often observed in LDCs might be due, not just to institutional
incapacity or a Machiavellian political elite, but to the short-term interests of LDC traders.
The key to our story is the general equilibrium interactions amongst contract defaulters
and their victims, both before and after default. In our model, traders negotiate contracts
before sinking the costs of entering a market, but can find these contracts unenforced if
repudiated. Defaulters and victims can resort to a spot market where their sunk costs are
irrelevant to the outcome of one-on-one bargaining. This market generally fails to equilibrate,
implying a transactions inefficiency, as some traders return home empty handed. Traders can
switch between the contract and spot markets, both before and after the disturbances to their
fallback options that motivate contract repudiation.
The general equilibrium effects of improved contract enforcement can increase the rate of
contract repudiation, so that fewer contracts are executed. This harms traders on the scarce
side of the spot market and perhaps the excess side also. For changes close to an equilibrium,
this can occur only if the equilibrium is unstable. However, improved enforcement could also
reduce contract execution via a jump between the stable equilibria that necessarily bracket the
unstable equilibrium. Such perversities arise when the disturbances to scarce side traders
fallback options have a heavy concentration well above their mean: an  upside shock , as
occurs in lognormal disturbances of sufficiently high coefficient of variation. Such shocks can
arise endogenously when the disturbances are to the costs of processing the good for re-sale.
Separately, each excess side trader exerts an externality on the others by reducing their2
probability of matching. Improved contract execution alleviates this congestion by attracting
more scarce side traders, but impedes exit from contracts found to be unfavorable, worsening
excess siders  expected terms of trade. For excess siders, this can mean that:
(i) perfect execution is worse than a range of high but imperfect levels of contract execution
and/or:
(ii) zero execution is better than a range of low levels of imperfect execution, even though:
(iii) perfect execution is better than zero execution and between these two situations, the
profits of an excess side monopsonist (monopolist) would fall as the price falls (rises).
In contexts (like international trade) where either buyers or sellers could veto changes in
enforcement,  these  results  offer  insights  into  why  contract  enforcement  often  remains
imperfect, despite the gains from trade foregone. For example, China, India or Russia would
appear to have the institutional capacity to enforce all international contracts, yet choose not
to do so perfectly. (i) and (iii) indicate that this policy could be in their overall interests, even
when they have too little market power to gain from the improved terms of trade that would
result from a reduced execution rate. Many  Fourth World  countries with little market power
show no movement toward enforcing international contracts, despite sermons from the World
Bank about the gains that await them from the foreign trade and investment that would be
attracted by better enforcement. (ii) and (iii) indicate that the small improvements that can
realistically be achieved by a  Fourth World  country might leave it worse off than zero
enforcement, even when the large improvements envisaged by the World Bank would indeed
make it better off. Our analysis also applies to domestic markets in the plausible case where
the traders on the side of the market with greater individual bargaining power dominate
institutional development because they are politically more effective.
When (i), (ii) and (iii) occur in conjunction with upside shocks to scarce siders  fallback
options, incremental enforcement improvements could cause excess siders  expected profits to
jump downward or could sharply reverse their previous gains, even within a conventionally
smooth economic structure. This possibility would make excess siders even warier of
improving enforcement. Indeed, given upside shocks, incremental enforcement improvements
could cause downward jumps in the expected profits of all traders.
Section 1 presents the core of our analysis. Section 2 motivates, sets out and solves our
formal model. Section 3 analyzes how enforcement affects contract execution and identifies3
perverse effects on scarce side traders. Section 4 shows how improved contract execution can
have effects (i) — (iii) above and integrates these results with those of Section 3. Section 5
applies our results to explain the levels of contract enforcement observed in LDC trade.
Section  6  considers  the  long-term  impact  of  improved  enforcement  and  suggests
interpretations of the historical evolution of contract enforcement. Section 7 discusses the
wider implications of our analysis for institutional evolution and future research directions.
1. Analytical Summary
Risk neutral agents trade in a market for contracts to deliver a good, at a price that is set
before trading costs have been sunk, or in a  spot  market before or afterwards. A buyer can
re-sell the good at home for a gross benefit that is subject to random disturbances; his net
benefit is computed by subtracting the price that he has to pay, as well as his trading cost
(which differs across buyers). A seller can procure the good at home at a cost that is subject to
random disturbances; his net benefit from trade equals the price he receives, less his
procurement cost and trading cost (which differs across sellers). The schedules of trading
costs across traders define the ex ante demand and supply schedules, i.e., the schedules when
buyers  gross benefits and sellers  procurement costs take their expected values.
Contracts are signed and trading costs sunk on the basis of traders  expected net benefits
from trade. The disturbances to traders  gross benefits/procurement costs are then realized;
traders  who  realize  disturbances  less  favorable  than  some  cutoff  level  repudiate  their
contracts. Only a parametric proportion of repudiated contracts are enforced. Repudiators who
evade enforcement, as well as their victims, can resort to the spot market, where there can also
be traders who chose not to contract.
On the spot market, traders are matched once for a price negotiation, whose outcome
depends only on the fallback options defined by the gross benefit/ procurement cost that the
negotiators realize, not on their sunk trading costs. The probability of a match depends on the
ratio of buyers to sellers on the spot market, some there by choice, others through contract
repudiation. The spot market is generally not in equilibrium ex post; it equilibrates ex ante in
the sense that traders shift between the spot and the contract markets until their expected
profits are the same in the two markets.
Via this equilibrium condition, traders  beliefs about the rate of contract execution
determine the cutoff values of their fallback options at which they repudiate their contracts;4
the level of enforcement then determines the actual rate of contract execution. Under rational
expectations, a given level of enforcement can be compatible with multiple rates of execution
when these rates are highly sensitive to the cutoff value of the fallback options. This would be
true when, on the scarce side of the spot market, the disturbances to traders  fallback options
have a heavy concentration well above their mean: an  upside shock . In this case, greater
enforcement could increase the rate of repudiation of contracts, so that fewer are executed.
This would certainly harm traders on the scarce side of the spot market. Figure 1 shows the
various ways that the enforcement rate can affect contract execution and scarce siders  profits.
Traders on the excess side can also be harmed by better enforcement, whether or not this
increases the rate of contract execution. Consider an  excess demand equilibrium , i.e., an ex
ante equilibrium in which there is excess demand in the spot market. Improved contract
execution harms buyers directly by impeding exit from contracts found to be unfavorable,
thereby worsening their expected terms of trade; but benefits buyers indirectly as more sellers
are attracted by the higher price that they expect; buyers are harmed overall if the supply
elasticity is low. Further analysis reveals that the effect of improved contract execution on
aggregate buyers  profits (which are monotonic in individual buyer s ex ante profits) is like
the effect of a price rise on a monopsonist. However, the price that buyers expect to pay
differs from the price that sellers expect to receive because some buyers who repudiate their
contracts fail to match on the spot market and end up buying on their home market. Thus, the
composite elasticity determining whether buyers are harmed by improved contract execution
is the ex ante supply elasticity multiplied by the ratio of the elasticities of the buyers  and the
sellers  expected prices with respect to the rate of execution. This ratio can be greater than or
less than 1 according to the stochastic structure of buyers  gross benefits, which determines
how changes in the rate of execution affect their decisions to repudiate.
Only the ex ante supply elasticity appears in the condition determining buyers  ranking of
zero and perfect execution (since both regimes preclude switches between the contract and
spot markets), whereas the composite elasticity inserted into the same condition determines
the impact of incremental improvements in the rate of contract execution. The discrepancy
between the two elasticities admits a variety of cases (see Figure 2) where the effects of a
small improvement in contract execution are opposite to those of a large improvement, such5
as that from zero to perfect execution. The requisite conditions on model parameters feature
the riskiness of gross buyer benefits relative to the level of their net benefits. These conditions
are compatible with the upside shocks to buyer benefits that admit multiple values of contract
execution for a given enforcement rate, opening the door to complex comparative statics as
enforcement increases. Figures 1 and 3 provide overviews of the possible outcomes.
2. The Model
2.1. Model Motivation
Motivated by the frequent incidence of imperfect contract enforcement in the real world,
we seek a model of trade where perfect enforcement is better than zero enforcement for both
sides of the market, yet for one side, imperfect enforcement can be (i) better than certain
enforcement and/or (ii) worse than no enforcement. This calls for a model with the following
four elements. Firstly, to motivate the use of contracts, we assume that trade imposes costs
that  are  sunk  at  the  time  of  exchange:  setting  up  a  trading  infrastructure,  acquiring
information, packaging, shipping, etc.
 1 Contracts address the threat of  holdup , i.e., ex post
bargaining  that  ignores  the  counter-party s  sunk  costs.  Secondly,  to  motivate  contract
violations, our model assumes that, after the contracts have been signed, each trader s net
benefits of trade are subject to independent random disturbances that lead some to repudiate
their contracts. Thirdly, we admit imperfect contract enforcement, parameterized as the
probability that a repudiated contract will be enforced. Contracts are inherently incomplete in
that it is impossible to contract on the effectiveness of the enforcement system.
2
Finally, we assume that traders who repudiate their contracts, as well as their victims, can
resort to a spot market where sunk trade costs are irrelevant. This is perhaps the most
parsimonious way to capture general equilibrium interactions amongst traders with enforced
and unenforced contracts in a way that permits imperfect enforcement to be in the interests of
at least one side of the market. Appendix B on alternative trading mechanisms argues that if
the victim of a repudiated, unenforced contract cannot renegotiate with anyone but is thrown
                                                   
1 Roberts and Tybout (1997); Bernard and Wagner (1998) document that sunk trade costs are large.
2 In contrast, the complete contracts literature analyzes optimal (and implicitly perfectly enforceable) contracts
but limits what attributes of a transaction can be contracted. McLaren (1998) analyzes trade and contract
limitations. The incomplete contract approach can be simultaneously criticized as hand-waving and defended as
realistic (Tirole, 1999). We use it for tractability and discuss robustness of the model in Appendix B.6
back  onto  his  home  market,  then  the  ex  ante  profits  of  all  traders  would  increase
monotonically with improvements in contract enforcement. Moreover, if the victim can
renegotiate only with the repudiator, then the contract price is efficient and ex ante profits are
unchanged by improvements in enforcement; the enforcement level would affect only ex post
profits.
 It is the possibility of the victim re-negotiating on the spot market, where he might
meet a counter-party who never contracted, that makes the problem of imperfect enforcement
interesting, for it leads to feedbacks between the spot and contract markets that admit multiple
equilibria and a non-monotonic relationship between the ex ante profits of traders and the rate
of contract execution. Appendix B also notes that contract repudiators cannot prevent a spot
market by offering victims an advance payment to refrain from searching there.
 Our model is otherwise kept simple to focus attention on the feedbacks between the
contract and spot markets. We assume that a trader s fallback option is to trade at home at an
exogenous price. Search on the spot market is simplified to a matching mechanism where the
objective probability of matching is the ratio of aspiring traders from the two sides of the
market. Bargaining is simplified to the Nash form, whose outcome depends on the fallback
options  of  the  two  parties  and  on  an  index  of  their  relative  bargaining  power.  Such
simplifications cleanly reveal mechanisms that must be at work in more realistic models.
2.2. The Trading Mechanism
Risk neutral buyers and sellers meet to exchange a good in a trading zone which they enter
at a deterministic cost that generally differs from trader to trader. The trading cost schedules
determine the ex ante demand and supply schedules, as further explained in Section 2.5. Each
buyer buys one unit of the good, which accounts for an infinitesimal share of the market. A
buyer anticipates re-selling the purchased unit back in his home market at a price b+µ ; a seller
anticipates procuring the good in his home market at a price c-ν . Here, b and c are fixed
numbers; µ  , ν   are random disturbances with zero means, unknown at the time that the traders
have to sink their costs of entering the trading zone, but realized immediately afterward. The
disturbances µ  (ν)   for  the  various  buyers  (sellers)  are  identically  distributed  and  all
disturbances are pairwise independent. A buyer who enters and executes a deal at price
preceives payoff bp +− µ ; a buyer who enters, but executes no deal, returns home to buy the7
good at b+µ  and receives zero payoff. A seller who enters and executes a deal receives payoff
pc −+ ν ; a seller who enters, but does not execute, returns home to resell the good at c − ν
and receives zero payoff.
Before sinking trading costs, each trader can enter into a contract to deliver the good. The
market mechanism for such contracts costlessly determines a market-clearing price. Once he
learns his own benefit/cost disturbance, each party to a contract must decide whether or not to
repudiate it, knowing the probability distributions of disturbances of all traders, but not the
disturbance suffered by his counter-party. The victim appeals to a court, which, however,
enforces only a parametric proportion θ  ∈[0,  1] of the repudiated contracts. The victim of a
repudiated, unenforced contract must choose between (i) renegotiating with the repudiator, (ii)
returning to his home market or (iii) entering the spot market.
We open our analysis of traders  decisions under the interim assumptions:
(2.1) The victim of a repudiated, unenforced contract enters the spot market, i.e., he neither
renegotiates with the repudiator nor goes home.
(2.2) Traders who would be on the scarce side of the spot market never repudiate a contract.
These assumptions will be maintained until Lemmas 3 and 4, which provide conditions
ensuring that these assumptions hold in a rational expectations equilibrium.
On the spot market, any trader has but one chance of being matched with a counter-party,
then bargains one-on-one. Therefore, there is no mechanism to adjust the spot price after the
disturbances: the typical outcome on the spot market is a mismatch between supply and
demand. We assume that all scarce side traders match, but on the excess side, some must
return home without trading. Excess side traders shift ex ante between the spot and the
forward markets until their expected return is the same in both. This determines the contract
price. In a rational expectations equilibrium, excess side traders  subjective beliefs about the
probability that they will match on the spot market equal the objective probability.
2.3. Buyers
Buyers can contract or enter the spot market directly where they seek a match with sellers.
All matches result in asymmetric Nash bargaining, whose threat points are defined by the
bargainers  realizations of their fallback options b+µ   and c-ν.   This leads to the price:8
ωµ ω ν () () () bc ++ − − 1
where ω ∈(0,  1) indexes the seller s bargaining power.
 3 Conditional on a match, spot buyers
expect to pay:
(2.3) pEb c b c
* [ ( ) ( )( )] ( ) ≡ + +− − = +− ωµ ω ν ω ω 11 .
Conditional on a failure to match, they expect to pay b. Therefore, a buyer who directly enters
the spot market expects to pay:
(2.4) pp b
b =+ − ππ
* () 1 .
where π  is the probability of matching, to be determined in equilibrium.
Let  p
C be the price that would be paid by contracting buyers who execute, including those
who repudiate their contracts but find them enforced nevertheless. After contracts have been
signed, both parties sink the cost of entering the trading zone. Each buyer then learns the price
b + µ  at which he can sell the good in his home market; each (foreign) seller learns the price
c − ν  at which he can procure the good in his home market. Traders then decide whether or
not to repudiate their contracts; under our interim assumptions (2.1) and (2.2), repudiators
who evade enforcement and their victims then enter the spot market.
  A buyer who suffers disturbanceµ  expects to negotiate a price  p
* + ωµ  on the spot market
if he matches; otherwise, he expects to pay b+µ  on his home market. Therefore, a buyer who
fails to execute his contract expects to pay πω µ πµ () ( ) ( )
* pb ++ −+ 1 . The disturbance at










A buyer expects to pay less than the contract price on the spot market if and only if he realizes
a disturbance µ  < µ *. Thus, across the buyer population, the probability of repudiation is:
                                                   
3 This is the price p that maximizes (b+µ -p)
ω (p-c+ν )
1-ω .  We interpret asymmetric Nash bargaining in terms of
strategic play with a probability that bargaining will end. Meeting the critique of Binmore, Rubinstein and
Wolinsky (1986) we suppose that the random event that ends the bargaining is a movement of price in one of the
partners  home markets that is more favorable to that partner than any feasible bargain. Then the other partner
must return home to his fallback option. This rationalizes using traders  fallback options as the threat points in
Nash bargaining. (We implicitly restrict the probabilities of favorable price movements to be small enough that
the expected payoff to bargaining dominates waiting for the favorable event.)9







where f () µ  is the marginal probability (density function) of µ ,  assumed to be piecewise
continuous over its support [µ ,µ ].
We now compute the buyer s ex ante gross benefits from a contract, taking account of his
option to default. Given a rate of enforcement θ    ∈[0,  1],  contracts are executed at rate:
(2.6) βθ =− + 1F F .
A buyer who does not execute his contract must have chosen to repudiate it. The expected
value of the disturbance to his fallback options, conditional on repudiation, is the expected
value of those disturbances that are less than µ *:







m() µ *  is negative, being less than the zero mean of the distribution of µ . The buyer expects to
pay  pm
* (* ) + ωµ  if he matches on the spot market; bm + (* ) µ  if he fails to match and returns
home. Thus, by (2.4), conditional on non-execution, the buyer on the contract market expects
to pay:
πω µ π µ π ωπ µ [ ( *)] ( )[ ( *)] ( ) ( *)
* pm b m p m
b ++ − + = + + − 11 .
Overall, the buyer who contracts expects to pay:
ββ π ω π µ pp m
Cb +− + + − ( )[ ( ) ( *)] 11 .
Buyers shift between the contract and the spot markets until this equals the price  p
b that they
expect on the spot market if they enter it directly, i.e., until:
(2.7) pp m
Cb −= − + − − > ( *)( )( ) / µπ ω π ββ 11 0  for β  < 1.
(2.7) is the premium over the expected spot price that buyers are willing to pay for a contract,
because if they suffer an unfavorable benefit disturbance, then they have the option to
repudiate the contract and seek a lower spot price. Eliminating p
C between (2.5) and (2.7), we










This determines the critical value µµ β
* () =  compatible with equilibrium, given an execution
rate β∈[0,  1].
We can solve for the contract price as a function of θ  by noting that, in equilibrium, the
rate of execution β  must generate a repudiation rate F(µ (β) ) via (2.8) that confirms (2.6), i.e.:
(2.9) 11 −=− βθ µ β ( )(() ) F
Lemma 1: (A) For β   ∈[0,  1],  there exists a unique µ (β ) satisfying (2.8). µ(0)   = µ ,   µ(1)   =   0.
(B) For  θ   ∈[0,  1], there exists a β(θ)   ∈[0,  1] satisfying (2.9). β(0)   = 0 ,   β(1)   =   1.
Lemma 1 determines a µ (β (θ )) compatible with equilibrium in the contract market. This
depends only on the distribution of benefit disturbances µ   and  the  parametric  rate  of
enforcement θ : it does not depend on the probability π  of a match, nor on sellers  bargaining
power ω . Then µ (β (θ )) determines equilibrium values for F and m. Henceforth, µ , F and m
shall be understood to take these equilibrium values, unless other arguments of these functions
are specified. Given buyer beliefs about π , p
C is then determined by (2.7) and (2.4).
2.4. Sellers
The above calculation allows for excess demand in the spot market (π  < 1) as well as
excess supply (π  = 1). A symmetrical derivation is possible for sellers. Below, we present the
sellers  decisions only for the case where the spot market equilibrium exhibits excess demand.
We can show that sellers then always sign contracts.
The proportion of buyers in the spot market who have defaulted on contracts equals the
ratio of seller victims of default to total buyers in the spot market. Our interim assumption that
traders who would be on the short side of the spot market never repudiate contracts implies
that this ratio equals π , the buyer s probability of matching on the spot market. Defaulting
buyers suffer a benefit disturbance of m < 0 on average, so the impact of their disturbances on
the spot price that sellers expect to negotiate isωπ m. Seller victims of default expect to
receive  pm
* + πω , so sellers with a contract expect to receive:11
(2.10) pp p m
sC =+ − + ββ π ω () ( )
* 1 .
Solving (2.7) for  p
C and substituting into (2.10):
(2.11) pp p m
sb =− − −  +( - )
* ββ β π 11 1 () ()
By (2.4):
(2.12) pp b m p
bs =+ − − + − () () ( * ) 11 βπ
In the last term in (2.12), b + m
 - p* equals the premium over the spot price expected by
buyers who avoid executing their contracts, fail to match and therefore pay their home price,
which they expect to be bm + . () () 11 −− βπ  is the probability of the latter two events. Thus,
() () ( )
* 11 −− + − βπbmp  is the additional amount that buyers expect to pay over what sellers
expect to receive because buyers can end up purchasing at home rather than from sellers.
In an excess demand equilibrium, sellers always sign contracts because their expected
price  p
s with a contract exceeds the price  pm
* + πω  that they expect if they enter the spot
market uncovered. This can be seen from (2.11), (2.3), (2.4) and (2.8), which imply that:
(2.13)
pp m pp m m
bc 0
sb −− = − − − −−
=− − − + − + − >
**
*
() ( ) ( )
() () () [ () / () ].
πω β β π πω
βπ ω µ β π π ω β
11
11 1 1 
2.5. Equilibrium
To determine equilibrium, we specify the structure of demand and supply in more detail.
Risk neutral buyers demand the good (enter the trading zone) at price p if their trading cost is
weakly less than the gain b - p that they expect. Risk neutral sellers supply the good (enter the
trading zone) at price p if their trading cost is weakly less than the gain p — c  that they expect.
Ordering buyers and sellers by increasing trading cost, let t
d(q) be the trading cost of the
marginal buyer when the total quantity bought is q; let t
s(q) be the trading cost of the marginal
seller when the quantity sold is q. The ex ante demand at price p is the d = d(p) such that the
marginal buyer is indifferent between trading or not trading, i.e., t
d(d) + b = p. The ex ante
supply at price p is the s = s(p) such that the marginal seller is indifferent between trading or
not trading, i.e., t
s(s) + c = p.
The expected outcome of bargaining on the spot market is the p* specified in (2.3). If
d(p*) > (= /<) s(p*), then, absent a contract market, the spot market would exhibit excess
demand (equilibrium/ excess supply). We shall show that this conclusion remains valid after
the introduction of the contract market. For concreteness, we focus on the excess demand case12
where d(p*) > s(p*); the excess supply case follows from symmetry.
In a rational expectations equilibrium, the ex ante subjective probability of a match for the
excess side and of a match with a defaulter for the scarce side must equal the ex post objective
probability. Thus, the equilibrium π  satisfies:














The numerator on the right side equals the number of sellers who are in the spot market
because their contracts were repudiated. The denominator equals the number of buyers in the
spot market, i.e., the total number committed to trade, less those whose contracts are executed.
Lemma 2: If dp sp () ()
** > , then for each β    ∈[0,  1],  (2.14) has a unique solutionπ [β ] ∈(0,  1).
The π  determined by Lemma 2 defines an excess demand equilibrium. To close the model,
we now state conditions ensuring that the interim assumptions (2.1) and (2.2) used so far in
our analysis of individual buyers and sellers hold in a rational expectations equilibrium
because they would be in the interests of the traders.
Lemma 3: In an excess demand equilibrium, a seller victimized by a repudiated, unenforced
contract expects a higher payoff from entering the spot market than from renegotiating with
the repudiator or returning to his home market, provided that under any cost disturbance ν , he
expects gains from spot trade. This would be true if and only if:
(2.15) ω (b - c + π m) > - ν
where ν   is the worst (most negative) realization of ν.
Lemma 4: (A) In an excess demand equilibrium, a seller who learns his cost disturbance
expects higher profits from honoring the contract than from entering the spot market, provided








i.e., the worst cost disturbance to the seller is less than the cutoff value
  µ (β (θ ))of the buyer s
benefit disturbance (at which he would be indifferent between honoring and repudiating the
contract)   weighted by the relative bargaining power of sellers.13
(B) If (2.15) also holds, then the seller expects higher profits from honoring the contract than
from returning to his home market or renegotiating with his counter-party.
Proposition 1: Suppose that (2.15) and (2.16) hold and θ∈(0,  1). If  dp sp () ()
** > , then there
exists an excess demand equilibrium in which:
(i) buyers directly enter both the spot and contract markets; for some benefit disturbances,
buyers with a contract repudiate it; those who evade enforcement enter the spot market;
(ii) sellers always sign contracts and never repudiate them; victims of repudiated contracts
enter the spot market.
If dp sp () ()
** <  then similar conclusions hold for an excess supply equilibrium.
Assumptions (2.15)  and (2.16) will be maintained henceforth. For concreteness, the
following comparative static analysis assumes an excess demand equilibrium where the sellers
are on the scarce side. Similar results hold for an excess supply equilibrium.
3. Impact of Enforcement on Contract Execution and on Sellers
3.1. Perverse Effects of Increased Enforcement
We analyzed the equilibrium by determining the endogenous variables as functions of the
rate of contract execution β , then determined β  as a function of the enforcement rate θ .
Similarly, we analyze the impact of θ  on the endogenous variables via β . A subscript   indicates
partial differentiation with respect to the corresponding variable; for functions with only one
argument (such as µ (β (θ )), m(µ (β )) or F(µ (β ))), a subscript indicates total differentiation.
Lemma 5: µ ββ β << < 00 0 , ,  and   mF .
Thus, key endogenous variables are monotonic in β . However, β   itself need not be
monotonic in θ.  Recall:
(2.9) 11 −=− βθ µ β ( )(() ) F .
The left side is the subjective non-execution probability; the right side is the objective non-
execution probability, given the subjective non-execution probability. An increase in θ
decreases the objective probability of non-execution below the subjective probability. How14
must β  change to restore equality? An increase in β  decreases 1- β ,   but also decreases µ(β)
and hence F(µ(β)) . If its proportional impact on F(µ(β))  is stronger than on 1- β , then equality
could be restored only by a decrease in β . Lemma 6 confirms this perverse outcome when F is
elastic to µ , and excludes it when F is linear in µ .
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1{ 1F () } m ) −−
 for some  µ   ∈ (0, ) µ ,
then either  β θ  (θ ) < 0 for some θ  ∈(0, 1) or β  jumps upward when θ  increases from 0.
(B) β θ  (θ ) > 0 for all θ  ∈[0, 1] if and only if (3.1) is reversed for all µ ∈ (0, ) µ . This is true
when µ    is  uniformly distributed, in which case βθ θ () = .
3.2. Exogenous and Endogenous Upside Shocks
Since the right side of (3.1) is less than 1, the hypothesis would be satisfied by a
concentration of buyer disturbances at some value µ   well above their (zero) mean, so that
µ f(µ )  > 1 . There are two complementary ways in which such an  upside shock  might arise
within the i.i.d. disturbances to buyers  fallback options. They could arise if each buyer comes
from a locality where some political/administrative favor could permit a sharply-higher gross
benefit, the windfall gains being concentrated at some level µ  > 0. They could also arise
endogenously from the economic/mathematical structure of the costs of processing the traded
good for re-sale, as we now show.
Suppose that the traded good is processed using a range of local inputs, whose prices are
uncertain when contracts are signed, being either exogenous or equal to their unit production
costs marked up by some exogenous factor. These unit production costs in turn depend on the
prices of upstream inputs, the iterative dependencies terminating in the set of direct and
indirect input prices that the buyer views as exogenous, if uncertain. Suppose that all
production functions are Cobb-Douglas, so that their unit cost functions are Cobb-Douglas in
the input prices. By repeated substitution, the cost of processing the traded good would then
be a Cobb-Douglas function of all the markup factors and exogenous input prices, i.e., the15
processing cost is the product of these terms raised to some exponent.
Suppose that this uncertain processing cost constitutes the downside disturbance z from
the buyer s maximum gross benefit, b+µ    so that z is the product  of non-negative terms Zi,
i = 1,2,   Then the z with the highest marginal probability arises as the product of draws of
various sizes from the various Zi. If the Zi are large in number and independently distributed,
4
then this modal z  will be much smaller than the mean z, which is a probability-weighted sum
of terms that are dominated by the products of large draws from all the Zi   which will be
very large. Then the disturbances µ =   µ  - z to buyer benefits would have a mode µ  =   µ  - z
that is much larger than their mean of 0 and therefore satisfies (3.1).
This intuitive argument is supported by the Central Limit Theorem (Aitchison and Brown,
Theorem 2.9, p.14), which implies that, as the number n of independent disturbances Z1,..,Zn
becomes large, their product zn becomes lognormal asymptotically   so that its mode  zn  is
indeed less than its mean. When lnzn  has a large variance (because n is large and/or
lnZ1,...,lnZn have large variances), the marginal probability of the mode zn  will be low, but the
gap µ  =   µ  - zn  between the mode and the mean will be very high. This ensures a high µ f(µ ),
despite the low marginal density f(µ ). This is confirmed by:
Lemma 7: If the downside disturbances z ≡    µ − µ  from the maximum buyer s benefit b+µ
have a density function that is a lognormal, then (3.1) holds for sufficiently large values of the
parameter σ
2 ˚≡   variance[lnz] that determines z s coefficient of variation.
 5
More generally, substitutability amongst the exogenously-priced ultimate inputs to the
processing of the traded good tends to make the cost multiplicative in their prices and in the
markup factors in the intermediate input markets. Then the modal value of the processing cost
would be well below its mean, given non-negative covariation across a large number of highly
                                                   
4 Our conclusions would be strengthened by positive covariation amongst the exogenous input prices and markup
factors: the mean of the product of the Zi, i = 1,2, .  would then tend to be even larger relative to the modal value
of the product. The reverse would be true if negative covariation prevailed.
5 As we show in Appendix A, Lemmas 7 and 8 remain valid if the lognormal distribution of z is truncated at the
level z0 that would yield zero gross benefits, and the probability mass from the right tail is compressed into a
spike at z0. This corresponds to a buyer dumping the good if gross benefits would otherwise to be negative.16
variable exogenous input prices and markup factors. The probability of buyer default would
then be elastic to the level of buyer disturbances at their modal value, so that the execution
rate can respond perversely to the enforcement rate. The consequences for the structure of
equilibria are now explored.
3.3. Instability and Multiple Equilibria Under Upside Shocks
Perverse comparative statics, as in Lemma 6A, are often associated with instability and
multiple equilibria. Local stability of our equilibrium requires the subjective non-execution
probability to adjust toward its equilibrium value. Assuming that, out of equilibrium, the
subjective probability adjusts toward the objective probability, local stability would require
that when the subjective probability 1-β   is less than its equilibrium value 1-β (θ ), then it
should also be less than the objective probability, i.e., an increase in β  above β (θ ) decreases
the left side of (2.9) proportionately more than the right. This is equivalent to requiring that
β θ > 0.
For  a  given θ , the equilibrium value(s) of β  are the horizontal co-ordinates of the
intersection(s) of the horizontal line of height 1- θ   with the graph of g(β ) ≡  (1 F − βµ β ) / (() ) .
The associated equilibrium   is stable if and only if this graph is negatively sloped there, so that
β θ > 0.  Multiple equilibria correspond to multiple intersections of the graph of g(β ) with a line
of height 1-θ.   Furthermore, β (θ ) can jump up as θ  increases past 0 if g(β ) exceeds 1 for some
β   ∈(0,1) .
To relate this to hypotheses about buyer disturbances µ , we use (2.8) to convert g() β  into
a function G(µ ) ≡   1/F(µ ){1-m(µ )/µ } of µ  alone. Our taxonomy uses the following hypotheses:
[a] Gµ (µ ) > 0 for all µ∈[0, µ ].
(3.2) [b] Gµ (µ ) < 0 for some µ ∈(0, µ ),  but G(µ ) < 1 for all µ∈(0, µ ).
[c] G(µ ) < 1 near µ , but G(µ ) > 1 for some smaller µ∈(0, µ ).
[d] G(µ ) > 1 near µ .
(3.1) is equivalent to Gµ (µ )  <  0, so [a] rules out upside shocks. [b] — [d] require17
successively stronger upside shocks. To see this, first note that G(µ ) = 1. If Gµ (µ ) < 0 for a
range of µ  below µ , then G increases as µ  decreases over this range. [b] holds if this range is
small and/or -Gµ (µ ) is small, so that G never increases back up to the value 1. [c] holds if the
range is extensive and/or -Gµ (µ ) is large, so that G rises above 1. [d] holds if the range extends
to all µ  nearµ , so that G(µ ) rises above 1 nearµ . Thus, [b], [c] and [d] successively require
the upside shocks implied by (3.1) to be stronger and/or extend over wider ranges of µ . These
intuitive arguments are neatly confirmed by the lognormal model of Lemma 7:
Lemma  8: When
  downside disturbances from the maximum buyer s benefit  b+µ   are
lognormal, (3.2)[a], [b], [c], [d] arise in successively higher ranges of the parameter σ .
[Figure 1 here]
We now translate hypotheses (3.2)[a] — [d] on G( µ ) into properties of g(β ), then explain
their implications for the behavior of β (θ ), as displayed in Figures 1[a] — [d]. By  (2.9), the
inverse function of g(β ) defines β  as a function of 1-θ , so the graph of β    as a function of θ
depicted in Figure 1 is the graph of g(β ) as a function of  β , rotated 90 degrees anti-clockwise
and shifted down by 1 to start from the origin. 
[a]: gβ (β ) < 0 for all β ∈[0, 1] so β θ (θ)  > 0  for all θ ∈[0, 1].
[b]: The graph of g(β ) has a part that is positively sloped, but lies entirely below 1. g(β ) is
continuous, g(0 ) = 1 and g(1)  =  0, so g(β ) has an interior maximum β 1   and an interior
minimum β 2 . Let θ 1 ≡ 1−  g(β 1) , θ 2 ≡ 1−  g(β 2) . g(β 1)  < 1 so 0 < θ 1 < θ 2 < 1. β(θ)  increases over
(0,θ 1). As θ  increases past θ 1, β(θ)  can either increase along the positively-sloped lower part
of the graph or jump up to β 1. In (θ 1,θ 2), β(θ)  can take any of the values given by the heights
of the three points of the graph with horizontal co-ordinate θ .    The unstable equilibrium
defined by the intersection with the negatively-sloped middle part is thus bracketed by
intersections with the positively-sloped top and bottom parts, which define stable equilibria.18
Insofar as the equilibrium moves along the negatively-sloped middle part, β (θ )  would
decrease with θ  via a local movement from one unstable equilibrium to another. However,
β (θ ) could also decrease with θ  via a jump between a stable equilibrium on the top part of the
graph to one on the bottom part. As θ  increases past θ 2, such a decrease in β  would be sharply
reversed, as β(θ)  jumps up to the positively-sloped top part of the graph. Multiple upside
shocks to buyers would multiply the switchback pattern in (θ 1,θ 2).
[c]: The graph of g(β ) lies below 1 for β  near 0 but rises above 1 for some larger β , so the
graph must have a part that is positively sloped. Since g(1) = 0, g(β ) = 1 for some β 3  and β 4  in
(0,1). The contract market would be inactive when enforcement θ  = 0  ; when it is activated by
an increase in θ  above 0, β (θ ) could jump up from 0 to just above β 3 or β 4. The remaining
remarks in [b] apply when we set θ 1 ≡  0.   
[d]: g(β ) > 1 for β  just above 0. Since g(1) = 0, g(β ) = 1 at some β 4  in (0,1). An increase
in θ  above 0 would lead to an upward jump in β (θ ) from 0 to just above β 4. There need not be
multiple equilibria at θ > 0,    unless there are other upside shocks.
 3.4. Impact of Enforcement on Sellers
Lemma 9 extends the above analysis of β  as a function of θ  to the sellers  price p
s, hence
to the typical seller s expected profits as a function of θ . This leads to Proposition 2.




Hypotheses (3.2) [a] — [d] on buyer disturbances have the following implications for sellers:
[a]: Improved enforcement always benefits sellers.
[b,c]: (i) At some enforcement level θ , a marginal enforcement improvement could reduce
seller profits. The associated equilibrium is locally unstable, but must be bracketed by stable
equilibria;  the  marginal  enforcement  improvement  could  also  reduce  seller  profits  by19
provoking a jump from the stable equilibrium with the larger β  to the stable equilibrium with
the smaller β .
[b]: (ii) There exist 0 < θ 1 < θ 2 < 1 such that an increase in θ  past θ 1 could lead to a jump up
in seller profits; a decrease in θ  past θ 2  could lead to a jump down in seller profits.
[c]: (ii) An increase in θ  past 0 could lead to an upward jump in seller profits. There exists
0˚<˚θ 2 < 1 such that a decrease in θ  past θ 2  could lead to a jump down in seller profits.
[d]: An increase in θ  past 0 certainly leads to an upward jump in seller profits.
4. Impact of Enforcement on Buyers
4.1. Individual Versus Aggregate Buyer Profits
The impact of enforcement on (excess side) buyer profits is even more complex because
they need not be monotonic in the contract execution rate β . We shall analyze the impact on
individual buyers via the impact on aggregate buyer profits. Since increased execution raises
the price expected by suppliers, a useful benchmark for the marginal impact of execution on
buyers is the marginal impact of a price rise on a monopsonist facing the same supply
function s(p) and the gross benefits b  that  buyers  expect  on  their  home  market.  This
benchmark monopsonist receives gross profits:
(4.1) X(p) ≡  (b — p)s(p).
A routine calculation shows that the marginal impact of p on the monopsonist is given by:
(4.2)  Xp(p) < 0 if and only if ε
s(p)  <  p/(b - p)
where ε
s
p ps s ≡ /  is the elasticity of supply. A rise in p benefits the monopsonist by attracting
more sellers, but harms it by increasing its unit procurement costs. Overall harm results if the
supply elasticity is less than the ratio p/(p-b) of the price to the net revenue buyers expect
from trade. This behavior of X(p) as a function of p foreshadows the behavior of buyers
aggregate expected gross profits X as a reduced form function of β ,   from which we can infer
the behavior of individual buyer s profits, as follows.
Let the expected gross profits of a buyer be x = (b — p
* )π  so the price facing buyers given20
by (2.4) is p
b = b — x . Buyers  aggregate gross profits are:
Xx d bx =− ()
X is strictly increasing in x, so the impact of execution β  on x has the same sign as its impact
on X. To compute the latter, rearrange (2.14) as:
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By (2.12) and (2.4):
p




s ≡   p* + (b - p*)β (1 - π ) and r ≡  -(1 - π )(1 - β  )m
Therefore:
(4.3) X = (b — q
s)s(p
s) = {b — (p
s — r)}s(p
s)
Thus, buyers  aggregate expected gross profits equal the gross profits from purchasing the
foreign units s(p
s) at the notional price q
s and selling them at price b. However, this notional
price q
s falls short of the price p
s expected by sellers by an amount r. This is because some of
the units that generate profits for buyers are actually purchased domestically by buyers who
(i) choose to default on contracts, then (ii) fail to match with a foreign seller and so end up
with gross benefits that are expected to be lower by -m
 than the level b expected by the
average buyer. (4.3) has the intuitive interpretation that the shortfall r in the notional price q
s
paid by buyers for the foreign units equals the probability of events (i) and (ii) times the
expected home price advantage of defaulting buyers, - m.
4.2. Local Impact of Contract Execution on Buyer Profits
We now determine the impact of increased execution β  on the typical buyer s expected
gross profit x.  Let:



















be the ratio of the elasticities with respect to β   of the price p
s faced by the seller and the price
q
s notionally paid by the buyers when π  is held constant.  [β]  indicates a reduced form
functional dependence on β .
Proposition 3: In an excess demand equilibrium xβ [β]   < 0 if and only if ε
s∆[β]   < q
s/(b-q
s).
The intuition is as follows. Better contract execution benefits buyers by attracting more
sellers from whom to buy at the notional price q
s, but harms them by raising q
s: they expect
worse notional terms of trade, given the greater difficulty of exiting contracts found to be
unfavorable. Overall, buyers are harmed if the supply elasticity is low relative to the ratio of
the buyer s notional cost q
s to notional net receipts per unit, b - q
s. The impact of increased
execution  on aggregate buyer gross profits (hence on individual buyer gross profits), as
characterized by Proposition 3, is like the effect of a price rise on the benchmark monopsonist,
as characterized by (4.2). It is more complex, however, because the notional price q
s paid by
buyers differs from the price p
s expected by sellers which determines their supply response
˚hence the additional term ∆[β]    given by (4.4) , which converts a given percentage increase
in unit buyer notional cost into the corresponding percentage increase in unit seller receipts.
Lemma 1A shows that as β → 0, repudiation almost always occurs and the price expected
by sellers p
s →  p*. As β → 1, µ (β )→  0,  i.e., almost all buyers with disturbances below the
zero mean repudiate their contracts, but end up executing them anyway. Buyers and sellers
with a contract expect to pay the same price p
C so this equals the competitive equilibrium
price p
e such that dp sp
ee () () = . The corresponding boundary values of ∆[β]      are given by:



















Lemma 10 and Proposition 3 now yield:
Proposition 4: In an excess demand equilibrium:






















(A) states that zero execution would be a local maximum for buyers, given a supply
elasticity less than the ratio of the expected spot price p* to the net benefit from that price to
the buyer with the highest gross benefits (the first not to repudiate when enforcement rises
above zero). Buyers would then oppose any policy to increase the execution rate above zero.
(B) states that perfect execution would be a local minimum for buyers, given a supply
elasticity that is low relative to the product of (i) the ratio of the competitive price to the
expected net buyer receipts from that price and (ii) the ratio of the net buyer benefits of trade
expected at the spot price to the expected net benefits of those buyers whose disturbances are
below  the  mean  (who  would  all  seek  to  default,  given  a  marginal  imperfection  in
enforcement). Buyers would then oppose any attempt to perfect contract execution.
4.3.      Global Impact of Execution Rate on Buyer Profits
This sub-section considers the global impact of β  on expected buyer profits x[β ], in
particular,  when  Proposition  4 s  local  results  at  β = 0  a n d  β  =  1   would  be  reversed  at
intermediate β , leading to an interior maximum and/or minimum. This can be determined by
combining the above local analysis of xβ [0] and xβ [1] with a comparison of x[0] and x[1], as
in the following Lemma, whose proof is obvious from Figure 2:
[Figure 2 here]
Lemma 11: Suppose that the cumulative distribution functions of trading costs over traders
are continuous, so that x[β ] is continuous in β .
(A) If xβ [1] < 0 and x[0] < x[1], then as β  decreases from 1, x[β ] increases to an interior
maximum, but eventually decreases.
(B) If xβ [0] < 0 and x[0] < x[1], then as β  increases from 0, x[β ] decreases to an interior
minimum, but eventually increases.
(C) If xβ [0] < 0, x[0] < x[1], and xβ [1] < 0, then as β  increases from 0, x[β ] first decreases to
an interior minimum then increases to an interior maximum before decreasing to x[1].23
(D) If xβ [0] > 0 and x[0] > x[1], then as β  increases from 0, x[β ] increases to an interior
maximum, but eventually decreases.
The  ranking  of  x[0] and x[1]  can  be  determined  by  comparing  the  benchmark
monopsonist s profits X(p) = (b - p)s(p) at the prices p* and p
e that would obtain at the
execution rates β = 0    and β  = 1 .  This is because no buyers default at these execution rates. 
Lemma 12: In an excess demand equilibrium, if X(p*) < (>) X(p
e) then x[0] < (>) x[1].
In an excess demand equilibrium, p* < p
e. If X(p) is concave in p, then the ranking of
X(p*) and X(p
e) can be determined from the locations of p* and p
e relative to the price P
b that





e) > 0 = Xp(P
b). Given a concave
X(p), it follows that p
e < P
b. Since p* < p
e, it follows that X(p*) < X(p
e), so by Lemma 12,
x[0] < x[1], as required in cases (A) — (C). Lemma 11 and Proposition 4 now imply
Proposition 5A — C below. This proposition assumes that  X is concave as a function of sales,
rather than as a function of p, to ensure consistency within the hypotheses of (B) and of (C).
6
In case D, note that if p* < P
b < p
e and p* is close to P
b, then X(p*) ≅ X(P
b) > X(p
e) and
x[0] > x[1], as hypothesized in Lemma 11D. In fact, the concavity of X(p) would then imply
that Xp(p*) > Xp(P
b) = 0, so (4.2) and Proposition 4A would imply that xβ [0 ] > 0, the other
hypothesis of Lemma 11D. This leads to Proposition 5D.
                                                   
6 These hypotheses require that ε
s(p) increase as p increases from p* to p
e. This is inconsistent with X being
concave in p, but is consistent with X being concave in sales. The latter hypothesis suffices for the arguments
leading to Proposition 5. x[β ] would also have an interior minimum if xβ [1] > 0 and x[0] > x[1], but the
hypotheses required to ensure this that correspond to those in Proposition 5B would be inconsistent.24
Proposition 5: Suppose that the cumulative distribution functions of trading costs over traders
are continuous and that the benchmark monopsonist s profits are concave as a function of


















 then a reduction in execution rate from β  = 1



















then an increase in execution rate from β  = 0




























 then an increase in
execution rate from β  = 0 initially decreases buyer profits, then increases them, but eventually
decreases them again to a level x[1] > x[0].
(D) If p* < P
b < p
e and p* is sufficiently close to P
b, then an increase in execution rate from β
= 0 initially increases buyer profits, but eventually decreases them to a level x[1] < x[0].
See Section 1 for an intuitive explanation of how the various hypotheses fit together to
generate this Proposition. The bounds in (A) admit a broad range of supply elasticities, if (i)
the competitive price is small relative to the net benefits of trade at this price, but (ii) the ratio
(b - p*)/(b - p*+m(0)) is large, i.e., there is substantial downside risk in net buyer benefits
from spot trade in that the expected net benefits are large relative to the expected value of
those net benefits that are below the mean. The bounds in (B) admit a broad range of supply
elasticities if the spot price p* is large relative to the maximum net benefits of trade b - p*+µ .
Case (C) combines (A) and (B).
4.4. Global Impact of Enforcement on Buyers
Proposition 5 s conclusions about the non-monotonic impact of β  on buyer profits x carry
over to the impact of θ  on x when the equilibrium β(θ)  is unique and increasing in θ  (i.e.,
buyer disturbances satisfy (3.2)[a]). Outcomes are yet more complex if there are multiple25
equilibrium β(θ)    for a given θ  (i.e., buyer disturbances exhibit upside shocks satisfying (3.2)
[b], [c] or [d]) while β  has a non-monotonic impact on buyer profits x (as in Proposition 5).
Over a range of θ  where x is increasing in β , the graph of x as a function of θ   is then like
Figure 1 (although it would intersect the vertical axis above the origin). Over a range of θ
where x is decreasing in β ,  the graph would look like Figure 1 flipped vertically, as in Figure
3. The analysis of Section 3 then implies that an incremental improvement in enforcement
could: harm both buyers and sellers ([b,c](i)); offer buyers local gains that would be sharply
reversed under further incremental improvements ([b,c](ii)); cause a downward jump in buyer




Hypotheses (3.2)[a] — [d] on buyer disturbances have the following implications for buyers:
[a]: Proposition 5 holds for buyer profits as a function of enforcement θ .
[b,c]: (i) There exists θ  ∈(0, 1) such that β θ (θ ) <0.  If xβ [β (θ )] > 0, then a marginal
improvement  in  enforcement  above θ  harms  both  buyers  and  sellers.  The  associated
equilibrium is locally unstable, but is bracketed by stable equilibria; a small enforcement
improvement could also harm both buyers and sellers by provoking a shift from the stable
equilibrium with the larger β  to the stable equilibrium with the smaller β .
[b,c]: (ii) Suppose that xβ [β (θ )] < 0 over an interval (θ 3,θ 4 ) where 0 < θ 1 < θ 3 < θ 4 < θ 2  < 1,
so that buyer s profits behave as in Figure 3[b] over this interval. An increase in θ  between θ 3
and θ 4 could increase buyer profits through: (I) a local movement from one unstable
equilibrium to another (along the positively-sloped middle part of the graph); (II) a jump from
an unstable to a stable equilibrium (from the middle to the top part of the graph), or (III) a
jump between stable equilibria (from the bottom to the top part of the graph). However, an
increase in θ  above θ 2 would lead to a downward jump in buyer profits.
[b]: (iii) 0 < θ 1 and an increase in θ  past in θ 1 could lead to an upward jump in β  (from a26
lower to an upper part of the graph in Fig. 1[b]). If xβ [β ] < 0 over this range of β , then buyer
profits would jump downward (Fig. 3[b]).
[c]: (iii) An increase in θ  past in 0  could lead to a jump upward in β  (from 0 to β 3 or β 4 in Fig.
1c). If xβ [β ] < 0 over this interval, then buyer profits would jump downward (Fig. 3[c]).
[d]: An increase in θ  past 0 certainly leads to an upward jump in β  (from 0 to β 4 in Figure
1[d]). If xβ [β ] < 0 over this interval, then buyer profits would jump downward (Fig. 3[d]).
5. Implications: Contract Enforcement and Economic Development
The introduction asked why LDCs do not set up institutions that ensure the enforcement of
international contracts. Our analysis identified circumstances where improved enforcement
harms a country s traders. We now argue that these circumstances are often found in LDCs.
LDC traders are likely to be on the excess side of the spot market if their spot bargaining
power is strong. Reasons why this might be so are suggested both by a formal model of
bargaining and by informal considerations. In Rubinstein s (1982) formal model of bargaining
as alternating offers, each agent has some chance of a very favorable price offer arriving from
his home market before the next round which would cause him to exit from the bargaining. In
refusing his last offer and starting another round of bargaining, his partner faces the possibility
that he will exit. The bargaining power of an agent in this setup is his probability of the very
favorable home price divided by the sum of the two probabilities of favorable prices.
7 In
LDCs, markets tend to be thin and background institutions unstable, leading to regime shifts;
both factors make prices highly variable, so that the LDC trader has a high probability of a
very favorable home price, hence strong bargaining power according to the formal model.
At an informal level, casual empiricism suggests that LDC traders have strong bargaining
power on home turf because they can exploit local institutions and rules of the business
game,˚which are opaque and poorly codified. Bargaining success is enhanced by personal
qualities: shrewdness, charm, ruthless focus. Even if both countries have the same distribution
of  personalities  across  their  populations,  business  competition  in  an  LDC  with  weak
                                                   
7 As noted previously, this setup meets the critique of Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1986) by justifying
the use of fallback options as the threat points in the bargaining game.27
institutions is more likely to select for bargaining skills, while business competition in a
developed country with strong institutions is more likely to select for other skills, such as
navigating complex formal rules and managing large bureaucracies.
The above discussion leads us to focus on the case where LDC buyers are on the excess
side of the market.
8 We now explore the implications of our analysis for this case. Proposition
4A states that such buyers oppose initial attempts to enforce contracts if and only if the supply
elasticity is less than the ratio of the autarky price to the maximum buyer benefits from trade
at that price. A low price elasticity of international supply of goods to an LDC is likely since
price rises cannot compensate for institutional failings that jeopardize the personal security,
property and coherent management of the trade offices necessary in the LDC. The poorest
LDCs, like those in Sub-Saharan Africa, provide a plausible context for spot bargaining that
yields a price p* that is lower than the competitive equilibrium price p
e, yet is high enough
that p*/(b - p*+µ ) exceeds the supply elasticity. In such countries, Proposition 4A predicts
domestic opposition to initial attempts to enforce contracts.
Proposition 4B states that buyers would oppose attempts to perfect contract execution, if
and only if the supply elasticity is less than the product of (i) the ratio p
e/(b-p
e) of the
competitive equilibrium price to the expected net buyer benefits from that price and (ii) the
ratio (b - p*)/{b + m(0) - p*} of expected net benefits from spot trade to the expected value of
those net benefits that are below the mean. Ratio (ii) would be high if buyer disturbances have
substantial downside risk below their mean so that m(0) is strongly negative. Countries like
Russia, India and China provide a plausible context for the postulated combination of spot
bargaining that yields a price lower than the competitive price, a low price elasticity of supply
from international sellers fearful of institutional inadequacies, and substantial downside risk to
buyers.  Our  model  predicts  that  such  a  country  would  not  seek  perfect  execution  of
international contracts, even if the government had the requisite institutional resources.
The global analysis of Proposition 5A-C yielded parameter combinations ensuring that the
above conclusions are compatible with anarchy being inferior to perfect contract execution, so
that improvements in execution have a non-monotonic effect on buyer welfare. Case (C)28
yields particularly complex effects: an improvement initially harms buyers, then benefits
them, then harms them as execution becomes certain. This highlights the complex ways in
which incremental institutional improvements could be blocked by vested interests, even
when they would gain from larger-scale improvements. The analysis also shows that two
countries whose traders have similar characteristics and face similar supply conditions could
end up with very different levels of contractual enforcement in international trade: one could
set zero enforcement because this is a local optimum for its traders, while the other could set a
positive, imperfect, level of enforcement because this is also a local optimum (or perhaps a
global optimum) for its traders. Alternatively, under the same conditions, vested interests in a
low enforcement country would oppose gradualist reform but support Big Bang reform.
In the opposite vein, Proposition 5D showed that initial gains to excess siders from
improved enforcement could prove deceptive, being reversed by further rises in the execution
rate; perfect enforcement would leave them worse off than zero enforcement. This follows
from the innocuous hypothesis that spot market bargaining leads to a price just less than that
charged by a monopsonist, which in turn is less than the competitive price.
LDCs offer a plausible context for each of Section 3.2 s accounts of how  upside shocks
can arise in buyer disturbances, leading to multiple equilibria and perverse outcomes. LDC
businesses often operate in local environments where major political/administrative favors are
dispensed, so that they could enjoy concentrated windfall gains. Where the traded good
requires more complex processing, the inputs required directly and indirectly often have
highly unstable prices and markups, again leading to upside shocks. Then a given enforcement
θ  could lead to multiple equilibrium levels of contract execution β(θ) . Adding this complexity
to the complex impact of β  on buyer profits renders even less reliable the gains from contract
enforcement. We now highlight some cases.
Where  better  contract  execution  increases  buyer  profits,  upside  shocks  to  buyer
disturbances raise the possibility that enforcement improvements would reduce contract
execution by local changes from an unstable equilibrium or by jumps between equilibria that
                                                                                                                                                                   
8 Similar remarks apply to the case of LDC exports to a developed country where LDC sellers are on the excess
side of the market.29
are stable. This would harm sellers as well as buyers, rendering counter-productive seller
pressure  for  improved  enforcement.  Conditions  ensuring  this  outcome  were  given  in
Proposition 6[a].
Where better contract execution would reduce buyer profits, an upside shock to their
fallback options introduces the risk that incremental enforcement improvements would result
in upward jumps in contract execution, hence downward jumps in expected buyer profits. By
Proposition 6, such jumps could occur for any increase in contract enforcement above 0, given
buyer disturbances satisfying [c] or [d]   which always obtain in the lognormal model at
sufficiently high levels of proportional uncertainty (σ     ‡ .63).  This  prospect  would  be
especially discouraging for LDCs considering whether to raise contract enforcement above
minimal levels in a highly uncertain environment. At the other extreme, LDCs considering
whether to perfect enforcement would be discouraged by the possibility that the gains from
previous enforcement improvements could be sharply reversed, as  in Proposition 6[b,c] (i)
when θ  increases above θ 2 . These cases obtain in the lognormal model at intermediate levels
of proportional uncertainty (.59 < σ    < 1.48).
6. Long-term Effects of Contract Enforcement
This section considers the long-term effects of international contract enforcement that
might operate via its impact on relative bargaining power, the foreign supply elasticity and the
stochastic structure of disturbances to traders  fallback options. Both our formal and informal
analyses  of  bargaining  power  point  to  a  long-term  linkage  to  the  quality  of  contract
enforcement in international business. The mechanism is that international business standards
become domestic benchmarks; institutions developed for international business come to be
invoked for domestic business. In the long term, this creates a more predictable environment
for domestic business as trading is codified, contracts enforced and prices reflect long-run
values more closely. In the formal model of bargaining power, this would lower the LDC
trader s bargaining power by lowering the probability of a very favorable price offer arriving
from his home market. In our informal discussion of bargaining power, the more stable
domestic environment would reduce the bargaining advantage of LDC traders by improving30
the transparency and codification of local rules of the business game. It would also reduce
pressures for LDC competition to select for bargaining rather than management skills.
These arguments underpin our hypothesis that dd0 ωθ / >  in the long term, i.e., improved
contract enforcement in the LDC increases the bargaining power ω  of foreign sellers. An LDC
policy maker who holds this hypothesis would consider not only the direct effect of improved
enforcement on his trader s profits, but also the indirect effects via the induced changes in
their relative bargaining power.
9 In an excess demand equilibrium, increased bargaining
power by foreigners forces domestic buyers to pay more, but also increases the number of
sellers, hence the probability of matching. If sellers are very price elastic, then this has the
paradoxical consequence that buyers gain from increased foreign bargaining power.
Let x{ω } = (b - p*)π   be a buyer s expected gross profit as a reduced-form function of
sellers  bargaining power ω .   An analysis like that for Proposition 3 shows that:
xω {ω } < 0 if and only if  ε























is the ratio of the elasticities with respect to ω  of the price p
s faced by the seller and the price
q
s notionally paid by the buyers when π  is held constant. However, when π  is held constant, ω
does not affect r ≡  -(1 - π )(1 - β )m. We conclude that:
Proposition 7: In an excess demand equilibrium




Linking the direct and indirect effects determined by Propositions 3 and 7 is:
Lemma 13: For values of β  close to 0 (1), q
s /p
s < (>) ∆[β].
Suppose that, at high enforcement levels, an increase in enforcement increases buyer profits31
directly. Since β θ (θ ) > 0 for θ  close to 1




s) by Proposition 3 and ε
s > p
s/(b - q
s) by Lemma 13. Proposition 7 implies
that the increase in ω  induced by the increase in θ  decreases buyer profits indirectly also.
Proposition 8: Suppose that  dd0 ωθ / >  in an excess demand equilibrium, i.e., improved
enforcement increases the bargaining power of scarce side sellers. For θ   close to 1, if an
increase in θ  increases expected buyer profits directly, then the induced increase in ω  also
increases expected buyer profits indirectly.
Thus, if a country with good enforcement improves it further in the short-term interests of
its excess side traders, and this improves the bargaining position of foreigners in the long
term, then this again benefits its own traders. Thus, long-term calculations would reinforce
short-term ones in driving the country toward better enforcement. Similarly, Lemma 13
indicates that if a country avoids enforcing international contracts in the short-term interests of
its excess side traders, then this calculation would be reinforced by the long-term effects of
improved enforcement on its traders  bargaining power. 
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Another possible long-term effect of improved contract enforcement is via changes in the
elasticity of supply. Section 5 argued that price rises would elicit little supply response from
traders fearful of poor institutional environments that jeopardize the personal security,
property  rights  and  coherent  management  of  their  trade  offices.  Improvements  in  the
institutional environment for foreign traders that spill into the domestic economy in the long
term could therefore increase the elasticity of supply of imports. By Propositions 3 and 7, this
makes it more likely that an increase in β  or ω  would increase expected buyer profits.
                                                                                                                                                                   
9 Sellers always gain from increased bargaining power since this increases the expected price that they face.
10 This follows because β (1 ) = 1 but β (θ ) < 1 for θ  close to 1.
11 If buyer disturbances satisfy hypotheses [a] or [b] in Section 3, then β θ (0 ) > 0. If an increase in enforcement
above 0 decreases buyer s profits directly, then xβ [0] < 0, ε
s∆[0]  < q
s/(b - q




by Lemma 13. Proposition 7 now implies that the increase in ω  induced by the increase in θ  decreases buyer
profits indirectly also. If buyer disturbances satisfy hypotheses [c] or [d], then β  jumps upward from 0. The same32
A third possible long-term effect of improved contract enforcement arises because the
required institutional changes would tend to level the playing field for business by insulating
it from political and administrative shocks. If this smoothes out the disturbances to traders
fallback options, then it would facilitate further improvements in contract enforcement by
eliminating the problems created by multiple equilibria that were analyzed in Section 3.
Thus, improved contract enforcement for foreigners could have long-term effects on the
domestic environment such that further improvements in enforcement are likely to generate
further short-term benefits to buyers, as well as long-term benefits as the bargaining position
of foreign suppliers is strengthened. Therefore, if a country starts with circumstances that
create a domestic constituency for improved contract enforcement in international trade, then
there are multiple channels whereby the improved enforcement strengthens the domestic
constituency for further improvements. The medieval commercial revolution of Western
Europe might provide a case in point. Competition amongst European jurisdictions meant that
each started facing quite high trade elasticities. Our model suggests that this created a
constituency within each jurisdiction for better enforcement of contracts with foreigners 
which fed back on itself via the long term mechanisms discussed above, leading ultimately to
the high levels of enforcement observed in modern times.
Proposition 3, Lemma 4B, Lemma 1B and Proposition 7 also imply that, when contract
enforcement θ  is high, we could have xβ  < 0 and xθ  < 0, but xω  > 0. Thus, improved contract
enforcement could reduce buyer profits in the short term but raise them in the long term by
increasing the spot bargaining power ω  of sellers. This possibility is enhanced if the improved
enforcement also increases foreigners  supply elasticity and smoothes out upside shocks to
buyers  fallback options at home. This suggests an interpretation of China s recent decision to
join the WTO. China s modernization has been fuelled by international trade, yet unreliable
contract enforcement has been a constant complaint of its trading partners. Thus, the short-
term interests of China s international sector have provided no domestic support for improved
enforcement of international contracts. However, China s policy-makers have now recognized
                                                                                                                                                                   
argument obtains, except in the picayune case where xβ [0] > 0, but the upward jump in β  nevertheless decreases
buyer profits because xβ (β)  < 0 over most of the jump.33
that such improvements are likely to spill over into its domestic environment in the long term.
The long-term benefits analyzed above may have helped motivate their commitment to the
sharp improvements in contract enforcement required by WTO membership.
12
7. Conclusions
In the absence of scale economies and market imperfections, standard microeconomics
determines general equilibrium market outcomes as smooth functions of endowments, tastes
and technology. This paper shows the complex phenomena that can emerge from general
equilibrium interactions when contracts are imperfectly enforced, but the economic structure
is  otherwise  smooth  and  conventional.  Incorporating  a  spot  market  in  which  contract
repudiators and their victims meet to trade is a parsimonious way to close a model of
imperfect contracting, while capturing the general equilibrium effects of feedbacks between
enforced and unenforced contracts. These feedbacks can lead to: (i) multiple equilibria,
unstable equilibria and perverse and discontinuous dependence of contract execution on
enforcement levels, when traders  fallback options are subject to upside shocks; (ii) non-
monotonic dependence of trader profits on contract execution levels, with zero a local
maximum and perfect execution a local minimum, given the transaction externalities in the
spot market.
Thus, even in a simple economy specified by smooth functions, general equilibrium
interactions  subject  to  imperfect  institutions  can  make  the  impact  of  institutional
improvements perverse, discontinuous, multivalent and subject to reversals smooth and sharp.
This reinforces a basic insight of New Institutional Economics   path dependence   by
showing that the identification of one state of affairs as being Pareto inferior to another
discretely far away is no guarantee that a political economy, let alone its institutional
infrastructure, can find a path from the inferior to the superior state. 
Within a unified political system, a veto of incremental institutional improvements by one
side of the market could, in principle, be overcome by a government that imposes large-scale
improvements from above. However, Barry Weingast has emphasized that  A government
strong enough to protect property and enforce contracts is also strong enough to confiscate the
                                                   
12 This was confirmed by Vice Minister Long Yong-Tu, China s lead WTO negotiator during a meeting in Hong
Kong on November 28, 2001. Another benefit is the consequent domestic improvements in the rule of law.34
wealth of its citizens.  Thus, broad consensus is essential for a move toward the rule of law,
as opposed to rule by law: our analysis offers one reason why a consensus for incremental
improvements might not be forthcoming in the vital arena of contract enforcement.
Two more complex political economy issues suggest themselves. Within a country, the
tradeoff between the competing enforcement interests of importers and exporters (and
producers of import-competing and export goods) could be analyzed within an interest group
competition model (Grossman and Helpman, 1995). On the international front, negotiations
over trade policy and enforcement occur both sequentially and simultaneously, raising the
issue of whether contract enforcement and tariffs are substitutes or complements.
Our model does not formally distinguish public from private enforcement of contracts.
Braudel (1992) presents many historical examples of ethnic networks that facilitate trust; see
also recent empirical work by Rauch and Trindade (1999). Do effective private networks
impede or complement the development of official enforcement? The domestic markets of
buyers and sellers are exogenous in this paper, though we have hinted at connections between
the formal protection extended to foreigners and subsequent domestic developments. A richer
model of the domestic markets and the nature of enforcement should yield many insights.35
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Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1
 (A) To apply Rolle s Theorem to (2.8), note that as µ  →  µ , m(µ )→  0  so -µ/ m(µ )→∞  . As µ  →
µ , -µ/ m(µ ) becomes negative. Given a piecewise continuous probability density function
f(µ ), -µ/ m(µ ) is monotonic and continuous in µ . Rolle s Theorem implies that there is a µ(β)
between µ  and µ satisfying (2.8). This is unique since -µ/ m(µ ) is monotonic in µ . For β  = 0,
the requisite µ  is µ . For β  = 1, the requisite µ  is 0. µ(β)  is monotonic and differentiable in β . 
(B) To apply Rolle s Theorem to (2.9), note that as β →  0, (1-β )/β  →∞   so the solution to (2.8)
µ (β )→  µ ,  and (1-β)/  F(µ (β ))→1 > 1−θ  when 0 < θ .    As β →  1, (1-β )/β  →  0, so µ (β ) →  0,
F(µ (β ))→ F(0) so (1-β)/  F(µ (β ))→0 < 1−θ   when θ < 1 .    Moreover, (1-β)/  F(µ (β )) is continuous
in β . Rolle s Theorem now implies that there exists a β∈[0,  1] satisfying (2.9). For θ  = 0, the
requisite β   is 0. For θ  = 1, the requisite β   is 1.
Proof of Lemma 2
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At an excess demand equilibrium, dp sp () () .


















Suppose that β∈[0,  1). As π  approaches 0 from above, h(π,β ) remains positive so that
h(π,β ) > π . Since h(π,β ) is continuous in π , Rolle s Theorem now implies that the equation
(8.1) π  = h(π,β )























































1 () < 0
Finally, when β  = 1, p
s = pb = p
e so (2.14) determines π[1]  as the solution to:
p







e < p* in an excess demand equilibrium, π [1]∈(0,  1). | |
Proof of Lemma 3
A seller default victim expects the fallback option of a repudiator in re-negotiations to be
bm + ; on the spot market he expects to meet some buyers who entered directly   whose
fallback option in spot negotiations he expects to be b. Consequently, he expects a higher
price in negotiations on the spot market than with the buyer who repudiated his contract.
Specifically, he expects to negotiate a price with the repudiator of p*+ω m; in deriving (2.10),
we showed that he would expect to achieve a higher price on the spot market of:
pm
* + πω  = ω b+(1-ω )c+πω m
His expected gain from spot trade is ω( b -c+π m)+ν , which is positive under hypothesis (2.15)
. Thus, he expects to do better than by returning home, which offers no gains from trade.
Since the seller is always matched in an excess demand equilibrium, he expects a higher
payoff from (i) entering the spot market than from (ii) renegotiating with the repudiator or (iii)
returning home. It follows that (i) would be chosen by a victim faced with alternatives (ii) and
(iii) without knowing the disturbance realized by the repudiator.
Proof of Lemma 4
(A) A seller who learns his cost disturbance ν  expects to negotiate a price on the spot
market equal to the price  pm
* + πω  that he expected before learning his cost disturbance plus
the increase  −− νω () 1  in that negotiated price due to the disturbance of his cost from its39
expected value (which drives up his fallback option). This second term is certainly less than
its value -ν(1−ω)  under his worst (most negative) cost disturbance. Thus, the seller expects a
higher price from honoring the contract than from a spot negotiation, provided that:
(8.4) pp m
C −+ > − − () ( )
* πω ν ω 1
(2.10) implies that:
(8.5) pp m p p m
sC −+ = −+ () [ () ]
** πω β πω
Substituting from (2.13) for  pp m
s −+ ()
* πω , we conclude that (8.4) holds provided that:
µπ π ωβν ω
*[( ) /( )] ( ) 11 1 −+ − > −−
Given hypothesis (2.16), this will be true because:
() / / () 11 1 −+ − > πωπ β
(B) An argument similar to that for Lemma 3 shows that if (2.15) holds, then a seller who
enters the spot market expects higher profits than by returning home. Thus, if both (2.15) and
(2.16) hold, then the seller expects more from honoring his contract than from returning home.
Next, consider what a seller expects from repudiating his contract and renegotiating with
his victim. His victim will require a price no less than what he expects to negotiate on the spot
market. His required price will depend on his benefit disturbance. The seller would not know
this benefit disturbance when he repudiates the contract; his expectations would be based on
the distribution of benefit disturbances across buyers. The seller rationally expects any
renegotiation to extract no more than the price p
b that buyers themselves expect to negotiate
on  the  spot  market  before  they  learn  their  benefit  disturbance.  (2.7)  implies  that  in
equilibrium, this is less than the contract price p
C. Thus, a seller expects more from honoring
his contract than from renegotiating with his victim.
Proof of Proposition 1:
This follows immediately from Lemmas 1- 4.40
Proof of Lemma 5
To compute how β  affects µ(β),  differentiate (2.8) logarithmically with respect to β  and




























At µ  = µ(β) > 0,   we have  _ < 0 , soµ β < 0 and:
(8.7) mf ββ µµ =  < 0.
Proof of Lemma 6
















































This has the same sign as:
(8.8) µµ µ µ µ f m mF fF m F f f F () ( ) ( ) −+ − − = − − − −
22 1
This is negative at µ  provided that (3.1) holds.
g(1 ) = 0 and g(0) = 1. If g(β ) > 1 for β  close to 0, then by Rolle s Theorem, there is some
β 4  < 1 such that g(β 4 ) = 1 (see Figure 1[d]). An increase in θ  past 0 would then lead to an
upward jump in β(θ)  to β 4 . Next, suppose that g(β ) < 1 for β   close to 0. Given hypothesis (3.1)
, let β  be the value of β  such that µ (β ) = µ . Then (8.8) and (3.1) ensure that gβ (β ) > 0. If
g(β ) < 1, then set θ  = 1 - g(β ) (see Figure 1[b]). Now suppose that g(β ) ‡ 1. Under our
maintained hypothesis that g(β ) < 1 for β  close to 0, the graph of g(β ) starts from β  = 0 at a
height of 1, initially falls, then turns and rises at least to the height of 1 at µ , where it is41
positively sloped. Therefore, the graph must have a positive slope at some β  <  β   where its
height is less than 1, i.e., gβ (β ) > 0 and g( β ) < 1. Set θ  = 1 - g( β ) (see Figure 1[c]).
(B) The first part of (B) follows immediately from the first paragraph of the proof of (A).
Suppose that µ  is uniformly distributed between —w and w for some constant w. Then:





















  1-θ =  (1-β)/  F(µ (β ))  = 1-β
2
so β(θ)  =  θ .
Proof of Lemma 7
























where M and σ
2   are the mean and variance of lnz. The expected value of z is exp(M+σ
2 /2). µ
= µ  - z has mean 0 so:
(8.10) exp(M+σ
2 /2)= µ
The maximum of φ(z) is attained at z ≡  exp(M - σ
2 ). For µ  = µ  - z :












































 by (8.9) and (8.10)
For large σ , this is greater than 1, so (3.1) holds when the density of z is lognormal throughout
its support.42
Suppose that we exclude negative gross buyer benefits by truncating the distribution of z
at the level z0 that would yield zero benefits, compressing the probability mass from the right
tail into a spike at z0. This does not affect the cumulative probability function for z less than
z0, but the resulting reduction in the mean of the distribution of z must be added to m(µ)  . This
adjustment affects only the cutoff value of σ  at which (3.1) is attained. ||
Proof of Lemma 8
With the change of variable z = µ  - µ  we have:
−= −
−
∫ mM zz d z (; ,) ( )() µσ µ φ
µµ
0
Let N(.) be the cumulative standard normal density. Exploiting standard properties of the














































These equations allow us to trace numerically the graph of G(µ ;0,σ ) for each possible
σ ,  confirming [a] — [d] when M = 0  for σ  in the intervals (0,.58], [.59,.62],[.63,1.48],[1.49,∞) .
For other values of M, the graph of G(µ ;M,σ ) = G(µ exp(M);0,σ ) can be derived from that of
G(µ ;0,σ ) by applying a positive monotonic transformation to the (G,µ ) plane along the µ 
dimension. Such a transformation does not affect properties [a] — [d].
Since µ (β ) is a (negative) monotonic function, the graph of g(β ) = G(µ (β); Μ,σ)    can be
obtained from that of G(µ; Μ,σ ) by applying a negative monotonic transformation to the (G,
µ ) plane along the µ   dimension. This leads to Figures 1[a] — [d]. The range of  σ  giving rise to
each case is that which gave rise to the corresponding graph of G(µ; 0, σ ).
For µ  in the interval [0, µ ], the adjustment used at the end of the proof of Lemma 7 to
exclude negative buyer benefits does not affect the cumulative probability function (8.12); in43
(8.11) it adds a constant term to m(µ ;M,σ ). This shifts the cutoff values of σ  defining cases [a]
— [d], but does not alter the Lemma s overall conclusion. ||
Proof of Lemma 9
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> 0 now follows from (8.15).
Proof of Proposition 3
























β  = (b - p*) (1 - π) > 0










X ≡  xd(b - x) = (b — p*)(1 - β  + βπ )s(p
s) ≡  H(β ,π (x))




 = Hβ   + Hπ π x
dx
dβ







 has the sign of Hβ , provided that:
0 < Xx - Hπ π x = d - xdp- (b — p*)π x  {β s + (1- β  + βπ )sp p
s
π }
But (b — p*)π x  = 1 so this is true provided that:
0 < Xx - Hπ π x = d - xdp + {-β s + (1 - β  + βπ )sp[β (b — p*) - (1 - β )m]} by (8.16)
This is always true since d ‡ β s. ||
Proof of Lemma 10
(A) By Lemma 1A, as β  →  0, and µ (β ) →  µ  so -m(µ (β) ) →  0. p
s →  p* and p
b →  p* so r
→  0 and q































Then - m β (µ (β )) →  µ  so rβ  →  (1−π[0]) µ , qβ  →(  b - p*)(1−π[0])  and ∆ [β] → 1 +µ /(b-p*).
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(B) By Lemma 1A, as β  →  1, µ (β )→  0, -m(µ (β )) →  -m(0 ), r →  0 and r/q→ 0. By (8.18)45
-mβ  →  0, so rβ  →   (1 - π[1] )m(0) and qβ  →   (1 - π[1] )(b - p*) so rβ /qβ  →   m(0)/(b-p*) and
∆ [β] → 1 + m(0)/(b -p*). p
s →  p
e.
Proof of Lemma 12
In an excess demand equilibrium at price p* (< pe) expected gross profits per buyer are:
x(p*) = (b - p*)„* = x[0]
where π * is the solution to π  = s(p*)/d((p* - b)„ + b). Under perfect enforcement, expected
gross profits per buyer are:
x(p
e) = b - p
e = x[1]
Aggregate buyers  gross profits at prices p* and p
e are:
X(p*) = (b - p*)s(p*) = x(p*)d(b - x(p*)) = x[0]d(b - x[0])
X(p




e)) = x[1]d(b - x[1])
Since xd(b - x) is increasing in x, the Lemma follows immediately.




s < ∆[θ]    if and only if  pq
ss
ββ >    , i.e., if and only if 0 < rβ  
In proving Lemma 10 we showed that as β → 0, rβ  → µ  > 0; as β→ 1, rβ  →   (1 - π )m(0) < 0.
Appendix B: Alternative Trading Mechanisms.
Suppose that the victim of a repudiated, unenforced contract cannot renegotiate with













The contract price is determined by the equilibrium condition:
dp b sp c
CC ( ( )) ( ( )) ββ ββ −− = +− 11 .
                                                                                                                                                                   
13 Sellers approach indifference to holding contracts as β  →  0, but we preserve continuity by assuming they hold
contracts of vanishingly small value.46
Trade would be inefficient because there is a gap between the buyers’ and sellers’ prices.
Increases in  β , the probability of execution, would raise trade volume and increase trader
rents on both sides of the market, hence all agents would prefer better enforcement.
Suppose that the victim can renegotiate only with the repudiator.
 So long as the probability
of execution is positive, the contracting market will clear at a contract price such that
db p p s p p c
CC [( ) ] [ ( ) ]
** −− − = + − − ββββ 11 .  For  any  β > 0,  the  effect  of  increases  in
enforcement is only distributional. Note that trade is efficient in this model: imperfect
enforcement is thus another environment where adding a market reduces efficiency.
Can repudiators remove the incentive for victims to search by private action? The answer
is no. In excess demand equilibrium, the buyer who defaults can offer the seller an advance
payment to renegotiate rather than search. At the average cost disturbance for default, the
buyer could afford to pay up to () 1− πω m. For buyers with sufficiently favorable realizations
of the cost disturbance process, such a payment is feasible. But for many defaulting buyers,
their realization of the disturbance is insufficiently favorable (such as those in the interval
m,
* µ [] ). Moreover, any buyer who could afford to make such an offer signals to the seller that
his disturbance is even better. Thus, advance payment of this type is unable to prevent a spot
market. A more involved question is whether the excess side can commit advance payment at
the contract stage which is sufficient to achieve efficient trading. It turns out to be impossible
to simultaneously reach efficient trade and yet ensure that the advance payment to the putative
scarce side does not induce them to default. Proof is available on request.47
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Figure 1: Impact of enforcement θ   on contract execution β(θ)   [ also on









[b] e.g., lognormal buyer disturbances with
0.59 <  σ  <  0.62
[c] e.g., lognormal buyer disturbances with
0.63 <  σ  <  1.48
[d] e.g., lognormal buyer
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θ
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Figure 2: Impact of contract execution β  on buyer s profits x[β ]
*
                                                   
* In simulations with a uniform distribution of trading costs over buyers and sellers, hence linear demand and
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[b] e.g., lognormal buyer disturbances with
0.59 <  σ  <  0.62
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